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I INTRODUCTION 
In the week after the July 2005 London bombings, seven mosques around 
Auckland were vandalised. Windows were smashed, and variations of the 
message "RIP London" inscribed on the walls. 
1 One year earlier, Jewish 
graveyards in several Wellington cemeteries were desecrated. In one incident, 
ninety-two gravestones were knocked over, a swastika gouged into the grass, and 
a small chapel reduced to a smouldering shell. A Holocaust survivor whose 
husband's grave had been attacked was shocked by the act, commenting that it 
brought back childhood memories of Nazi horrors.2 From 2001 to 2004, several 
Muslim people in the Wellington region received letters insulting their faith. The 
letters contained cartoons likening Muslims to pigs, used violent and threatening 
language, and sometimes included slices of ham or pork. Recipients of the letters 
reported that they feared for their safety, with one woman too scared to Jet her 
children play outside.3 
These and other incidents have ensured that hate speech has featured 
prominently in the public eye over recent years. 
4 In August 2004, the 
Government Administration Committee instigated an inquiry into the issue,5 with 
1 Angela Gregory "Police seek to charge teen with inciting racial tension" (16 July 2005) The 
New Zealand Herald Auckland <http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed 29 August 
2005). It is to be noted that the decision to charge the perpetrator of attacks against mosques with 
exciting racial tension is not a neat fit. While the NZCA has held that Jews in New Zealand 
constitute a group of people with ethnic origins (King-Ansell [ 1979] 2 NZLR 531 (CA)), these 
cases would fit much better under a provision that prohibits the inciting of religious hatred. 
2 Hayden Dewes "Vandals wreak havoc in Jewish cemetery'' (7 August 2004) The Dominion Post 
Wellingon <http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
3 "Sender of Muslim hate mail convicted" (21 July 2005) The Dominion Post Wellington 5. The 
author of the letters was convicted of harassing their recipients. Not all incidents of hate speech, 
however, could be dealt with under the Harassment Act 1997, which requires that the defendant 
has engaged in a "pattern of behaviour" directed at another person, "being a pattern of behaviour 
that includes doing any specified act to the other person on at least 2 separate occasions within a 
12 month period" (Harassment Act 1997, section 3(1)). 
4 Hate speech was an issue in the 2005 election campaign, with United Future listing as one of its 
two "bottom lines" the goal of "stopping hate speech laws" ("Labour churns out more election 
promises" (21 August 2005) The New Zealand Herald Auckland <http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). It is unclear whether United Future wishes to 
abolish New Zealand's current hate speech provisions or simply prevent their extension. 
5 Government Administration Committee "Inquiry into Hate Speech" (5 August 2004) Press 
Release. The reform of hate speech legislation was initially raised in the Government 
Administration Committee ' s examination of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classifications 
Amendment Bill (Government Administration Committee "Films, Videos and Publications 
Classifications Amendment Bill" (30 August 2004) Select Committee Report 3). During the 
submissions process, several contributors recommended that the scope of censorship law be 
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Justice Minister Phil Goff expressing the wish that the committee focus on the 
possible reform of the Human Rights Act 1993 (hereinafter the HRA). 6 At 
present, this legislation proscribes only written matter and words that excite 
certain feelings of hate on the grounds of race. 7 If the HRA's hate speech 
provisions are to be reformed, however, the grounds on which hate speech is 
prohibited may be extended to incorporate those listed in section 21(1), including 
religion, sexuality, gender, and soon, perhaps, gender identification. 8 The 
structure and phrasing of any new or modified hate speech provisions will 
require careful thought. 
Across the Tasman, too, the issue of hate speech has been a focus of 
public debate. In March 2002, a pastor of a Christian ministry conducted a 
seminar that ridiculed and demonised the Muslim religion. Muslim people were 
said to be inherently deceitful, and posters featuring the words "Rise Up 
Australia" were displayed. 9 In October 1999, a Sydney man was repeatedly 
harassed by a neighbour who disapproved of his sexuality. In one incident, the 
words "fag lives here, faggots should die" were inscribed on the man's door, 
together with a drawing of a large penis. 10 On 28 November 1995, a Sydney talk-
back radio host painted an unattractive caricature of a notional Aboriginal person, 
referring to him as "looking like a skunk and smelling like a skunk, with a 
extended to include hate speech. Justice Minister Phil Goff, however, has indicated that he does 
not consider censorship law the appropriate means by which to regulate hate speech, placing the 
issue firmly within the discourse of human rights (see note 6). 
6 Hon Phil Goff "Goff welcomes hate speech inquiry" (6 August 2004) News Release. The 
Justice Minister notes: 
Currently the Human Rights Act 1993 deals with inciting racial disharmony. I hope the 
committee, and public submissions to it, will address how that legislation has worked in 
practice, and whether changes are needed. 
7 Human Rights Act 1993 sections 61 , 131. For a more detailed account of the provisions, refer 
Part 11 Legislation. 
8 Georgina Beyer's Human Rights (Gender Identification) Amendment Bill provides for "gender 
identity" to be included as one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in section 21 of the 
HRA. The first reading of the Bill has been delayed until after the 2005 election ("Taking brave 
stand in world that labels them freaks" (24 March 2005) The New Zealand Herald Auckland 
<http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). 
9 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc ( Final) (2004] YCAT 2510 para 
IO<www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
10 Burns v Dye [2002] NSW ADT 32 para 34 <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 
2005). 
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sardine can on one foot and sandshoe on the other, and a half drunk bottle of beer 
under the arm" .11 
The perpetrators of these Australian instances of hate speech were all 
called to account under the civil provisions of the New South Wales or Victorian 
hate speech legislation. 12 As the mixed response of the Australian public to these 
decisions indicates, 13 the question of whether hate speech legislation is justified 
raises broad legal issues, including the fundamental right in a democracy to 
freedom of expression. While some argue that the proscription of hate speech 
constitutes an unjustified limitation on free speech, it must be remembered that 
hate speech can have the effect of alienating already marginalised members of 
society - a state of affairs that is itself detrimental to a healthy democracy. 
Australian cases demonstrate that the legislative proscription of hate speech can 
have a positive, cathartic effect on its victims, reaffirming their place within 
society .14 Finding the right balance between freedom of expression and freedom 
from vilification is challenging, but the Australian experience indicates that it is 
possible. 15 
11 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor [2000] NSW ADT I 02 para 6 Silva J 
and N Rees <www.austli.edu.aU> (last accessed 29 August 2005). While the defendant did not 
directly state the skunk-like, tin-can-wearing man he described to be Aboriginal, the NSW 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal held that the ordinary, reasonable listener would understand 
him to be referring to an Aboriginal person (para 139). 
12 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries , above, was brought under the 
Victorian legislation, the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 200 I. Burns v Dye, above, and 
Western Aboriginal Legal Service v Jones & anor, above, were both brought under the NSW 
counterpart, the Anti-Discrimination Act I 977. For a more detailed account of the provisions, see 
Part II Legislation. 
13 The recent decision of Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, above, in 
particular, aroused much public debate. For an example of an opinion against the outcome, see 
Amir Butler "Muzzling the haters doesn't make hate vanish" (4 January 2005) The Age 
Melbourne <www.theage.com.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). For an example of an opinion 
in favour of the outcome, see Waleed Aly "There is free speech, and then there is hate-inducing 
vilification" (23 December 2004) On Line Opinion <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au> (last 
accessed 24 August 2005). 
14 The majority of plaintiffs in the New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence have 
emphasised that the remedy they are most eager to attain is a public statement of apology or, 
alternatively, a public statement that the defendant has breached the legislation. This emphasis 
demonstrates that the acknowledgement that the defendant's vilifying conduct was unlawful is 
important to plaintiffs. See, for example, Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & 
anor [2000] NSWADT 102 para 163 Silva J and N Rees <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 
August 2005). 
15 For a more extensive discussion of the competing principles involved in the proscription of 
hate speech, see Human Rights Commission "Submission to the Government Administration 
Committee into the Inquiry into Hate Speech" paras 1.7 to 1.15. 
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This paper attempts to identify any modifications that the structure and 
phrasing of the HRA hate speech provisions require in order to achieve such a 
balance. Envisaging a future in which hate speech law is accorded a more 
prominent role within our legislative framework, the paper investigates the 
mechanics of how the current HRA formula, and especially the civil provision, 
can be modified to best protect the rights and freedoms at stake. Looking to the 
provisions' treatment by the courts, it will identify the questions raised by the 
New Zealand experience to date. In order to begin the process of answering these 
questions, the paper will tum to the jurisprudence of the Australian states of New 
South Wales and Victoria. While Australia boasts an extensive range of hate 
speech law, the similarity of the New South Wales and Victorian legislation both 
to each other and the New Zealand's HRA formula renders it best placed to 
provide a cohesive body of case-law from which lessons for New Zealand can be 
drawn. 
II THE LEGISLATION 
New Zealand has had hate speech legislation since 1971. 16 As noted 
above, however, it is limited to the proscription of conduct likely to excite racial 
disharmony. The sister provisions of sections 61 and 131 constitute respectively 
the civil and criminal provisions of the HRA. 17 Section 61 provides that it is 
unlawful for any person to publish, distribute, broadcast, or use in any public 
place, words that are "threatening, abusive or insulting" and which are "likely to 
excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons" in New 
Zealand on the ground of their race. 18 Section 131 has the same elements, except 
16 Race Relations Act 1971. See note 17. 
17 The Race Relations Act 1971, the precursor of the HRA provisions, originally contained only a 
criminal provision (section 25). In 1979, a civil provision was inserted (section 9A), only to be 
repealed ten years later. In light of public controversy about its impact upon freedom of speech 
and freedom of the media it appeared that, without an intent requirement, the threshold test that 
the words have the capacity to excite hostility, ill-will, contempt or ridicule was too low. While 
the HRA reintroduces the civil provision, a comparison of section 61 with its precursor makes 
clear that the legislature has decided to raise the threshold test. Under the new civil provision, 
words that excite the less serious feelings of ill-will and ridicule are not prohibited. See Juliet 
Moses "Hate speech: competing rights to freedom of expression" ( 1996) 8 Auk U LR 185, 186-
187. 
18 Section 61 of the HRA provides: 
( 1) lt shall be unlawful for any person-
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that the level of requisite excited feelings is lowered to include ill-will and 
ridicule. Further, there is a mens rea requirement of intent to excite these 
feelings. 19 Any prosecution under section 131 requires the consent of the 
A ttomey-General. 20 
The New South Wales and Victorian provisions are in many ways closely 
comparable to their New Zealand counterparts. While the Victorian provisions 
are the subject of separate legislation (the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 
2001, hereinafter the RRTA), New South Wales, like New Zealand, has placed 
the provisions within broad human rights legislation (the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977, hereinafter the ADA). A further difference between the two Australian 
jurisdictions is the period of time for which they have been in force. Whereas 
New South Wales was the first Australian state to enact hate speech legislation, 
(a) To publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(b) To use in any public place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences 
Act 1981, or within the hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any 
meeting to which the public are invited to have access, words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(c) To use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the 
person using the words knew or ought to have known that the words were 
reasonably likely to be publi shed in a newspaper, magazine or periodical or 
broadcast by means of radio or television,-
being matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group 
of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of their colour, race, 
or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
(2) It shall not be a breach of subsection ( I) of this section to publish in a newspaper, 
magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of radio or television a report relating to 
the publication or distribution of matter by any person or the broadcast or use of words 
by any person, if the report of the matter or words accurately conveys the intention of 
the person who published or distributed the matter or broadcast or used the words. 
19 Section 131 of the HRA provides: 
(I) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction for imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to 
excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of 
persons in New Zealand on the ground of their colour, race, or ethnic or national origins 
of that group of persons,-
(a) Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or broadcasts by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(b) Uses in any public place (as defined by section 2( I) of the Summary Offences 
Act 1981), or within the hearing of any persons in any such public place, or at a 
meeting to which the public are invited to have access, words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting,-
being matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt 
or ridicule, any such group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, 
or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
20 HRA section I 32. 
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Victoria is, at this point, the last.21 Despite the twenty-four years between the 
enactment of the two legislative schemes, however, none of the divergences 
between the RRTA and the ADA are significant for the purposes of this paper, 
with the structure and phrasing of the RRTA closely modelled on that of the 
ADA.22 
Turning first to the civil provisions, the ADA and the RRTA both provide 
that it is unlawful for any person to publicly "incite hatred towards, serious 
contempt for, or severe ridicule of' a person or group of persons on the grounds 
of specified characteristics of that other person or class of persons.23 Thus far, the 
21 The ADA was preceded only by the federal Racial Discrimination Act 1975. Only the Northern 
Territory is yet to enact hate speech legislation. 
22 Mr Bracks (Premier of Victoria) ( 17 May 200 I) Vic Hansard 1285 Parliament of Victoria 
<http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
23 Section 20C of the ADA provides: 
(I) It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, 
or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the 
person or members of the group. 
(2) Nothing in this section renders unlawful: 
(a) a fair report of a public act referred to in subsection(!), or 
(b) a communication or the distribution or dissemination of any matter comprising a 
publication referred to in Division 3 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 or which is 
otherwise subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation, or 
(c) a public act, done reasonable and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or 
research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including discussion or 
debate about the expositions of any act or matter. 
Section 7 of the RRT A provides: 
(I) A person must not, on the ground of the race of another person or class of persons, 
engage in conduct that incites hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or 
severe ridicule of, that other person or class of persons. 
(2) For the purposes of sub-section ( I), conduct-
(a) may be constituted by a single occasion or by a number of occasions over a period 
of time; and 
(b) may occur in or outside Victoria. 
Section 8 of the RRTA is identical to section 7, with the phrase "religious belief' substituted for 
the word "race". 
Section 11 of the RRT A provides: 
(I) A person does not contravene section 7 or 8 if the person establishes that the person's 
conduct was engaged in reasonably and in good faith-
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held, 
or in any other conduct engaged in, for-
(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific purpose; or 
(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or 
(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of 
public interest. 
Section 12 of the RRTA provides: 
(I) A person does not contravene section 7 or 8 if the person establishes that the person 
engaged in the conduct in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that 
the parties to the conduct desire it to be heard or seen only by themselves. 
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Australian approach is not radically different from that of New Zealand. Where 
the ADA and the RRTA depart from the HRA, however, is in their provision of 
exceptions that, if met, preclude liability. Even if conduct is objectively capable 
of inciting hatred, it does not contravene the civil provisions if it was carried out 
reasonably and in good faith in the public interest, or in a fair report of someone 
else's conduct. 
Turning to the criminal provisions, both the New South Wales and the 
Victorian legislature introduce requirements of intent and knowledge. 24 As in 
New Zealand, it is an offence in both jurisdictions for any person, on the grounds 
of the specified characteristics of another person or class of persons, to 
intentionally engage in conduct that the offender knows is likely to incite the 
requisite feelings of hostility. Unlike New Zealand, the two Australian 
jurisdictions introduce the concept that the conduct may threaten physical harm 
against that other person or class of persons.25 Whereas the RRTA requires that 
physical harm is threatened, the ADA provides that it is only one way in which 
the incitement can occur. The criminal provisions do not include exceptions to 
liability. 
(2) Sub-section (l) does not apply in relation to conduct in any circumstances in which the 
parties to the conduct ought reasonably to expect that it may be heard or seen by 
someone else. 
24 Whereas the RRT A explicitly requires intention to engage in conduct that the offender knows 
is likely to incite the requisite feelings, the ADA does not (see note 23). The New South Wales 
courts have held, however, that the legislature intended these requirements, and have read them 
into the Act. See Wagga Wagga Aboriginal Action Group & Ors v Eldridge [1995] EOC 78-260, 
265 Decision of the Tribunal. 
25 Section 20D of the ADA provides: 
(1) A person shall not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe 
ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or 
members of the group by means which include: 
(a) threatening physical harm towards, or towards any property of, the person or 
group of persons, or 
(b) inciting others to threaten physical harm towards, or towards any property of, 
the person or group of persons. 
Section 24 of the RRTA provides: 
(I) A person (the offender) must not, on the ground of the race of another person or class of 
persons, intentionally engage in conduct that the offender knows is likely-
(a) to incite hatred against that other person or class of persons; and 
(b) to threaten, or incite others to threaten, physical harm towards that other person 
or class of persons or the property of that other person or class of persons. 
(2) A person must not, on the ground of the religious belief or activity of another person or 
class of persons, knowingly engage in conduct with the intention of inciting serious 
contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of, that other person or class of persons. 
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It can be seen, then, that while the legislation of the two Australian 
jurisdictions is broadly similar to that of New Zealand, significant differences do 
exist. This paper will focus on the civil provisions, examining both the legislative 
differences and the differing approaches of the New Zealand and Australian 
courts in order to identify the means by which New Zealand's hate speech 
legislation may better achieve a balance between the rights and freedoms at stake. 
Ill GENERAL APPROACH 
Once the difficult decision to legislate against or extend laws proscribing 
hate speech has been made, the equally difficult matter of defining the prohibited 
conduct must be addressed. New Zealand's HRA provisions require both that the 
written matter or words are "threatening, abusive or insulting" and that they are 
"likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt" the requisite people.26 
That is, the provisions focus both on the effect of the hateful words or matter on 
their subject and on the response of those who may be excited to hate. By 
contrast, the New South Wales and Victorian provisions concentrate the enquiry 
exclusively on the matter of whether the conduct has the capacity to incite hatred 
in others. This approach is explained in the New South Wales case of Wagga 
Wagga Aboriginal Action Group v Eldridge: 21 
Section 20C [of the ADA] does not make unlawful the use of words that convey 
hatred towards a person or group of persons on the grounds of the race of that 
particular person, or members of the group ... The dividing line arises when by 
a public act a person incites others to have hatred towards, serious contempt 
for, or to severely ridicule a particular person or group of persons on the 
ground of race. 
From the outset, then, the direct harm caused to the subject of the hateful conduct 
is irrelevant to the enquiry of whether the New South Wales and Victorian 
legislation has been breached. 
While, at first glance, New Zealand's approach appears to differ 
significantly from that of New South Wales and Victoria, a closer analysis 
26 See notes 18 and 19. 
27 Wagga Wagga Aboriginal Action Group & Ors v Eldridge [1995] EOC 78-260, 266 Decision 
of the Tribunal (my emphasis) . 
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reveals that the HRA essentially follows an "incitement" model similar to that of 
the two Australian states. If, as the New Zealand legislation requires, conduct is 
capable of exciting hatred or contempt, then it will almost certainly follow that 
the further requirement that the conduct is threatening, abusive or insulting is 
also satisfied. In New Zealand, then, like in New South Wales and Victoria, the 
primary focus of the legislation is on the ability of the conduct to excite hatred. 
An alternative approach is demonstrated by the Australian federal Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975, which prohibits conduct likely "to offend, insult, 
humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people" on the ground of 
their race.28 Under the federal legislation, the capacity of the conduct to incite 
others to hatred is unlikely to be relevant. 29 Interestingly, the Model Bill that 
formed the basis of the Victorian public consultation process followed a similar 
approach to that of the Racial Discrimination Act. The public's response, 
however, was not positive, leading to the large-scale redrafting of the Bill. 
"[A]lmost to a person", the respondents thought that the Model Bill's focus on 
the likelihood of the conduct to cause offence was "a bit silly".30 
Despite the distaste of the Victorian public for the prohibition of conduct 
that conveys hatred towards a person on the grounds of their race or religion, this 
alternative approach ought to be considered if New Zealand is to modify the hate 
speech provisions of the HRA. 31 If one of the objects of hate speech legislation is 
to promote the full and equal participation of every person in society, 32 then 
28 Section 18C(l) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) provides that: 
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise that in private, if: 
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humi(jate or 
intimidate another person or a group of people; and 
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other 
person or of some or all of the people in the group. 
29 The capacity of the conduct to incite others is arguably relevant to whether the subject of the 
conduct is humiliated or intimidated. The effect on the victim of the conduct is, however, the 
Erimary enquiry. 
0 Hon CA Furletti (13 June 2001) VicHansard 1403 Parliament of Victoria 
<http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
31 Section 63 of the HRA proscribes conduct that is "hurtful or offensive" to a person on the 
ground of their race. The scope of the section is limited, however, by the requirement that the 
conduct is "either repeated, or of such a significant nature, that it has a detrimental effect on that 
other person in respect of" certain specified areas, including employment, education and housing. 
32 Section 4( l)(a) of the RRTA provides that one of the Act is " to promote the full and equal 
participation of every person in a society that values freedom of expression and is an open and 
multicultural democracy .. . " 
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legislative drafting that focuses on the victims of hate speech may be the best 
way to achieve it.33 While the HRA's current approach protects the subjects of 
hate speech from its capacity to excite further hatred against them, it does not 
protect the Muslim people who received letters insulting their faith. 34 As long as 
it is lawful to convey hatred to others on the ground of specified characteristics, 
hate speech remains lawful in New Zealand. 
IV WHAT SHOULD IT MEAN TO EXCITE HATRED? 
In light of the fact that the hate speech provisions of the HRA effectively 
focus on the capacity of the words or written matter to excite hatred, it is 
necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of what that excitement entails. While 
the issue is touched upon in several cases, 35 the majority of the admittedly 
limited New Zealand hate speech jurisprudence is notable for its propensity to 
eschew the issue. 36 Beyond the face of the HRA itself, then, it is necessary to 
look to the New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence to assess what it ought 
to mean to excite hatred in New Zealand. 
33 Sometimes, hate speech is highly insulting to a group of people but unlikely to excite feelings 
of hostility against that group. Jones v Scully, a case brought under the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth), involved the distribution of a number of anti-Semitic pamphlets, including "Russian 
Jews Control Pornography" and "The Inadvertent Confession of a Jew" . The material was held to 
breach the Act, as it was likely to offend or insult the "Jew in Australia" (Jones v Scully [2002] 
FCA 1080 Rely J paras 108, 197, 224 <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). 
Under a provision that focuses on the capacity of material to excite hatred in others, however, the 
same result would not be assured. While it could be argued that the material is likely to excite the 
requisite feelings of hostility, it is possible that it would be found so ridiculous as to be unlikely 
to excite these feelings, leaving the victims of the hate speech with no legal recourse. See Burns v 
Dye [2002) NSW ADT 32 paras 54-94 Decision of the Tribunal <www.austlii.edu.au> (last 
accessed 29 August 2005), Veloskey & Anor v Karagiannakis & Ors [2002] NSW ADTAP 18 
p,ara 43 Decision of the Tribunal <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
4 See note 3. 
35 Neal v Sunday News (1985) EOC 92 Decision of the Tribunal, Skelton v Sunday Star Times (29 
April 1996) Complaints Review Tribunal CRT 24/95 Decision of the Tribunal. See Part IV C 
Who Should the Legislation Require is Excited to Hate? 
36 In King-Ansell v Police [ 1979) 2 NZLR 531, 535 Richmond P, the Court of Appeal decided 
against addressing what it means to excite the requisite feelings, contenting itself with the 
observation that the Magistrate's finding that the anti-Semitic document was calculated to incite 
ill-will against Jews in New Zealand was "quite inevitable". In Skelton v Sunday Star Times , 
above, the matter of whether the newspaper ' s editorial policy of using a capital letter for the first 
letter of the names of all ethnic groups except for that group known as Pakeha excited the 
requisite feelings against Pakeha was not considered, as it was held that the practice was not 
insulting or offensive. 
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While the HRA's wording that the hate speech must "excite" the requisite 
feelings of hostility is different to the New South Wales and Victorian provisions, 
which focus on the capacity of conduct to "incite" these feelings, this variation is 
not significant. As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, "excite" and 
"incite" share a common meaning - namely, to stir up, rouse, or urge to action.37 
This natural meaning fails, however, to clarify the evidential and legal 
requirements that conduct should be required to meet in order to constitute 
excitement: first, whether the HRA should require intention to excite; secondly, 
whether actual excitement should be necessary; and thirdly, the identity of those 
who the legislation should require are excited to hate. This paper will address 
each issue in tum. 
A Should Intention to Excite be Necessary? 
The criminal arm of the HRA is unambiguous in its requirement of intent. 
As provided in section 131, a person must not publish, distribute or broadcast 
spoken or written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting "with intent to 
excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of 
persons in New Zealand on the ground of their ... race".38 Without doubt, then, 
the crime of exciting racial hatred has the mens rea requirement of intent. 
By contrast, the civil arm of the HRA does not specify whether intent to 
excite the requisite feelings is required. Contrasting sections 61 and 131, 
however, the rules of statutory interpretation suggest that the legislature's 
decision to specify the requirement of intent in the latter and not the former 
indicates that the former does not require intent.39 Moreover, the word "excite" 
ought not to be interpreted in the same manner in the civil law as in the criminal 
37 J A Simpson, ES C Weiner (eds) Oxford English Dictionary (2 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989) V 506, Yll 796. 
38 See note 19. 
39 This approach is suggested by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one 
thing is to exclude another). See Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation (3 ed, Butterworths, 
1997) 969, 976-979. 
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Jaw. Whereas the criminal provision has a mens rea requirement, the civil 
· · h 40 prov1s10n oug t not. 
This reasoning is supported by the New South Wales and Victorian 
jurisprudence. While defendants have attempted to argue that the civil arms of 
the New South Wales and Victorian legislation include a requisite mental 
element, this approach has been consistently rejected by the respective Tribunals 
in the last five years. 41 As the New South Wales Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal has argued, to impose a subjective intent requirement in the civil 
provision would defeat one of its primary goals - namely, to ensure that all 
members of society "can have a dignified and peaceful existence free from racist 
harassment and vilification". 42 Instead of focusing on the defendant's state of 
mind, this goal is best met by assessing the capacity of the words or written 
matter to excite hatred in others.43 While New Zealand courts have already taken 
this approach, any remaining ambiguity can be clarified by modifying section 61 
of the HRA to specify that intent to excite the requisite feelings is not required. 
40 The distinction between the civil and criminal provisions is bolstered by the approaches of 
other jurisdictions. In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Canada v Taylor that the 
objectives of hate speech legislation "can only be achieved by ignoring intent", as the purpose of 
the legislation is not to punish wrongdoing but prevent harm (Canada v Taylor [1990] 3 SCR 892 
~ara 68 (SCC) Dickson CJ). 
1 See Burns v Dye [2002] NSW ADT 32 para I 9 Decision of the Tribunal <www.austlii.edu.au> 
(last accessed 29 August 2005), Kazak v John Fairfax Publications [2000] NSWADT 77 paras 
25-29 Decision of the Tribunal <www.austlii .edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005), Veloskey 
& Anor v Karagiannakis & Ors [2002] NSW ADTAP 18 paras 22-24 Decision of the Tribunal 
<www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005), Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited 
v Jones & anor [2000] NSWADT I02 paras 83-92 Silva J and N Rees <www.austlii.edu.au> (last 
accessed 29 August 2005), and Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc 
( Final) [2004] YCAT 2510 paras 13-14 Higgins J <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 
2005). As the New South Wales Administrative Tribunal notes in Veloskey & Anor v 
Karagiannakis & Ors, however, the approach of the New South Wales jurisprudence has not 
always been consistent. In Hellenic Council of NSW v Apoleski and the Macedonian Youth 
Association [ 1997] NSWEOT, the Equal Opportunity Tribunal accepted the defendant's 
submission that the incitement must be intended or foreseen . Malco & Ors v Massaris & Ors 
[ 1998] NSWEOT I02, too, can be read to imply that the defendant's state of mind is relevant, 
with the Tribunal commenting that there was no evidence to suggest that an inciting word was 
deliberately chosen by the defendant. As the Tribunal argues in Veloskey v Karagiannakis, 
however, these cases are not persuasive. Neither undertakes an exercise of statutory construction, 
and the Tribunal's comment in Malco appears to have been made in passing (Veloskey & Anor v 
Karagiannakis & Ors, above, paras 22-24). 
42 Kazak v John Fairfax Publications, above, para 15. 
43 Veloskey v Karagiannakis, above, para 23. 
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B Should Actual Excitement be Required? 
Both the civil and the criminal provisions of the HRA require that the 
written matter or words are "likely to excite" the requisite feelings of hostility 
against any group of persons on the ground of their race.44 New Zealand's hate 
speech law is thus explicit in its direction that actual excitement is not required in 
order for it to be breached. Instead, courts are to assess the objective likelihood 
that the words or written matter will excite the requisite feelings . 
The New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence indicates that New 
Zealand has taken the better approach. Neither of the Australian jurisdictions' 
provisions expressly indicate whether actual incitement is required, leaving the 
matter to be addressed by the courts. In the first case to be taken under the RRTA, 
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal analysed the policy issues at 
stake. While the task of determining the objective likelihood of the prohibited 
consequences occurring can be subjective and politically speculative, the 
Tribunal concludes that actual incitement ought not to be required. "If it were 
otherwise," the Deputy President states, "the effect of this section would be left 
to the vagaries of individual sensibilities."45 Requiring proof of actual incitement 
would impose heavy evidentiary burdens on complainants. "It would have to be 
established after the event that someone had experienced these strong feelings 
because of the conduct."46 This task would require evidence from those exposed 
to the words or written matter and may lengthen trials.47 
Of course, the fact that actual excitement is not required does not mean 
that the response of those exposed to the words or written matter in question is 
irrelevant. In Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries, the 
44 HRA sections 61 , 13 l. See notes 18 and 19 (my emphasis). 
45 Judeh v Jewish National Fund of Australia Inc [2003] VCAT 1254, para 38 McKenzie J 
<www.austlii.edu.aU> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
46 Judeh v Jewish National Fund of Australia Inc, above, para 38. 
47 The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal's approach is supported by the RRT Bill's 
second reading speech. With regard to the civil provisions, the Premier states that they proscribe 
"conduct that, objectively, promotes the strong emotions of hate, revulsion or contempt against a 
person or group on the basis of their race or reli gion" ((17 May 2001) VicHansard 1285 
Parliament of Victoria<http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.aU> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). By 
introducing an objective test to the assessment of the conduct, the Premier indicates that the 
provisions are directed to the conduct itself and not to the nature of the reactions to it. 
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Victorian Tribunal had to decide whether a Christian pastor's seminar on Islam 
had breached the RRTA's civil provision of inciting religious hatred. 48 
Throughout the judgment, the Tribunal is at pains to ascertain the precise nature 
of the audience's response to the seminar, seeking detailed testimony from the 
witnesses and listening to the tape of the presentation. The finding that the 
pastor's conduct "produces a response from the audience at various times in the 
form of laughter" can be seen to contribute to the decision that the seminar was 
objectively likely to incite severe ridicule of the Muslim religion.49 Thus, while 
actual incitement is not required in order for the Victorian provisions to be 
breached, it is relevant. New Zealand courts are likely to take a similar approach. 
C Who Should the Legislation Require is Excited to Hate? 
The objective focus on whether the conduct is likely to excite the 
requisite feelings raises what is perhaps the most difficult of the three questions: 
Whose likely response is the court to assess? With neither section 61 nor section 
131 of the HRA providing any indication of the legislature's intent, the matter is 
entirely in the hands of the judiciary. In the past twenty years, New Zealand 
courts have considered the issue in two cases. 
The question of who must be excited to the requisite feelings of hostility 
was first considered by the Equal Opportunities Tribunal in Neal v Sunday News. 
In that case, the plaintiff contended that the newspaper's publication of anti-
Australian jibes breached the civil provision of the Race Relations Act 1971, the 
precursor of the HRA.50 While the plaintiff drew attention to two of the potential 
paths that the Tribunal could take, suggesting it assess the likely effect of the 
publication "either on the average New Zealander or, alternatively, on that group 
of New Zealanders who might be less tolerant or have a lower threshold of 
48 
Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc (Final) [2004) YCAT 2510. 
49 
Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, above, para 383. The judgment does 
not state explicitly that it treats the audience's response as an evidentiary matter. This explanation 
of the decision is, however, the most likely. While no other Victorian or New South Wales case 
examined refers to the actual response of the audience as an evidentiary matter, this state of 
affairs is most likely because Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries is the only 
case in which actual incitement has occurred. 
50 See note 157. 
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sensitivity than the majority", the Tribunal appears to have ignored these 
possibilities. 51 Instead, it opted to focus on the likely response of "the group 
which includes the 200,000 purchasers of the paper and the 700,000 odd who 
would read the same".52 With respect, it seems that the Tribunal has missed the 
point. As the plaintiffs submissions indicate, the issue is not the identity of the 
audience but rather the characteristics of the audience members whose likely 
response is to be assessed. 
The Complaints Review Tribunal addresses the issue more satisfactorily 
in Proceedings Commissioner v Archer.53 Drawing on the plaintiffs submissions, 
the Tribunal notes that, in the context of assessing the capacity of the written 
material to excite hostility, the test of the reasonable person is inappropriate 
because he or she is unlikely to be excited to feeling hostility for groups who are 
racially different.54 Instead, the Tribunal opts to assess the likely response of 
people who are less perceptive or sensitive on racial issues than others and 
therefore vulnerable to being excited to hostility.55 In that case it was held that 
comments that Japanese people are short, dull and blind and ought to be thrown 
out of the country are capable of exciting racially insensitive people to hostility 
towards Japanese people living in New Zealand. 
The New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence has taken a different 
approach. Faced with a dearth of authority, the courts have relied on tests 
developed under defamation law. This approach involves discounting the likely 
responses of people "who are at either end of the scale" - that is, "either 
51 Neal v Sunday News Auckland Newspaper Publications [1985] 5 NZAR 234,239 Decision of 
the Tribunal. 
52 Neal v Sunday News Auckland Newspaper Publications, above, 240. 
53 Proceedings Commissioner v Archer [1996] 3 HRNZ 123 Decision of the Tribunal. 
54 Proceedings Commissioner v Archer, above, 127. 
55 A similar approach is taken by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. In Nealy v Johnston, the 
Tribunal rejected the "ordinary reasonable person" test, contending that the assessment of the 
conduct should extend to the response of the less reasonable, and even of the downright 
malevolent (Nealy v Johnston (25 July 1989) Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 10/89 para 64 
Decision of the Tribunal). The case was brought under section 13( 1) of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act 1985, which prohibits specified conduct "that is likely to expose a person or persons 
to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the 
basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination". 
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malevolently inclined or free from susceptibility to prejudice".56 In the middle 
remains the "ordinary reasonable person", and it is this specimen whose likely 
response the New South Wales and Victorian courts have determined they must 
estimate.57 
Contrasting the Australian jurisdictions' "ordinary reasonable person" 
test with New Zealand's "less perceptive or sensitive person" counterpart, it is 
clear that the Australian approach has several drawbacks. At a superficial level, it 
is unattractive and unconvincing for the courts to assert that the "ordinary 
reasonable person" would be incited to hate by a defendant's conduct. In Burns v 
Dye, for instance, the New South Wales Tribunal held that the defendant's 
inscription on the plaintiff's door that "fag lives here, faggots should die" is 
capable of inciting the ordinary, reasonable person to "hatred of, or at the very 
least serious contempt for," the plaintiff.58 One would hope and expect that the 
ordinary person is a little more reasonable. Under New Zealand's "less 
perceptive or sensitive person" approach, the courts are able to condemn hate 
speech without depicting hatred on the grounds of the specified characteristics as 
"ordinary" and, even more unattractive, "reasonable". 
What is more, the decision of the New South Wales and Victorian courts 
to import defamation law concepts is itself contentious. While the Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal contends that its application is "logical in the 
context of the use by the legislature of the words hatred, ridicule and 
contempt", 59 there are significant differences between defamation and hate 
speech law. 60 Whereas defamation law primarily operates to protect the 
56 Kazak v John Fairfax Publications [2000] NSW ADT 77 para 38 Decision of the Tribunal 
<www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
51 Kazak v John Fairfax Publications, above, para 71. 
58 Burns v Dye [2002] NSWADT 32 para 88 Decision of the Tribunal <www.austlii.edu.au> (last 
accessed 29 August 2005). Similarly, in Western Aboriginal Legal Service v Jones, the Tribunal 
assessed that a radio announcer's reference to a notional Aboriginal person as an unattractive 
drunken skunk would most likely have incited the ordinary reasonable listener to severe contempt 
and severe ridicule of Aboriginal people (Western Aboriginal Legal Service Ltd v Jones & anor 
[2000] NSWADT 102 para 143 Silva J and N Rees <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 
August 2005)). 
59 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc ( Final) [2004] YCAT 2510 para 14 
Higgins J <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
60 In Judeh v Jewish National Fund of Australia, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
notes that it is best to "be cautious before importing into the provisions of the [RRTA] concepts 
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individual, hate speech legislation is enacted to protect collective groups. 
Inherent in this difference is the potential of hate speech law to prevent a greater 
scale of harm than defamation law - a circumstance that can be argued to justify 
that the bar for the breach of hate speech legislation is set lower than that for 
defamation law. 
Thus, the New Zealand courts' "less perceptive or sensitive person" test 
appears to be the better approach. While at first glance it could be perceived that 
the breadth of the test places it in danger of unjustifiably impinging on freedom 
of speech, it must be remembered that, in order for spoken or written matter to 
have breached the HRA, it must be likely to excite people to the requisite feelings 
of hostility. The application of the New Zealand approach to the New South 
Wales decision of Bums v Dye, for instance, would be unlikely to alter the 
Tribunal's decision that the incident in which the defendant yelled homophobic 
abuse outside the plaintiffs door did not breach the civil provision of the ADA.61 
No matter how unreasonable and malevolent the potential audience, the sight of a 
drunken and possibly mentally ill individual hollering crude expletives would be 
unlikely to excite anyone to the requisite feelings of hostility towards the plaintiff. 
The "less perceptive or sensitive person" test, then, does not represent too low a 
threshold.62 
D Summary 
A critique of the phrasing and interpretation of New Zealand's 
"excitement" provisions in light of the New South Wales and Victorian 
taken from defamation law (Judeh v Jewish National Fund of Australia Inc [2003] VCAT 1254, 
para 36 McKenzie J <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). 
1 In Burns v Dye, the defendant's act of inscribing the message "fag lives here, faggots should 
die" together with a drawing of a large penis on the plaintiff's door was found to have breached 
the ADA. However, the defendant's act of yelling "cock sucker", "faggot cunt" and other terms 
of abuse was not, as it was not thought to be capable of inciting others to the requisite feelings of 
hostility. The defendant's act of smearing faeces and urine was also held not to breach the ADA 
for the same reason. (Burns v Dye [2002) NSWADT 32 paras 54-94 Decision of the Court 
<www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005).) 
62 The "less perceptive or sensitive person" test is not precluded by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. While the approach does impose a limitation on freedom of expression, as 
protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights, this limit is "reasonable and demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society", as required by section 5 of the Bill of Rights, and as such is 
consistent with the rights and freedoms therein. See Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003) 138. 
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experience indicates that New Zealand is on the right track. While section 61 of 
the HRA ought to be amended in order to render unambiguous that intent to 
incite the requisite feelings is not required in order for it to be breached, this 
alteration would probably not change the law as it stands. What is more, instead 
of following the New South Wales and Victorian approach of assessing the 
capacity of the words or written matter to excite the requisite feelings in the 
"ordinary, reasonable person", New Zealand courts ought to build upon their 
own approach of assessing the likely response of the "less perceptive or sensitive 
person". While the New Zealand jurisprudence on what it means to excite hatred 
is only in its developing stages, it shows great potential to achieve an appropriate 
balance between freedom of expression and freedom from vilification. 
V EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY 
In New Zealand, once it is established that the spoken or written matter is 
both threatening, abusive or insulting and likely to excite the required feelings in 
the less perceptive or sensitive members of its audience, the HRA has been 
breached. While section 61 of the HRA makes provision for the fair report of 
prohibited words and written matter in the media, 63 neither the civil nor the 
criminal provisions include any means by which the original communicator of 
the hate speech may be excepted from liability.64 
By contrast, in New South Wales and Victoria, the establishment that the 
conduct incites the required feelings is only half the story. In addition to the fair 
report exception, the civil provisions of both the ADA and the RRTA exclude the 
63 HRA section 61(2). See note 18. 
64 By requiring that the spoken or written matter is published or distributed (section 61(1)(a)), or 
used in a public place (section 61(l)(b)), the HRA can also be seen to contain a private conduct 
exception, in that written matter or words do not breach the Act if they are spoken or written in 
circumstances in which they do not reach the public ear. The ADA adopts a similar approach, 
precluding conduct that incites hatred "by a public act" (see note 23). By contrast, the RRT A is 
not limited to public conduct. Instead, conduct is precluded from liability if it is performed "in 
circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to the conduct desire to be 
heard or seen only by themselves" (see note 23). No case brought under the RRTA thus far raises 
the private conduct exception, and there is no evidence to suggest that New Zealand would be 
better off framing the private conduct proviso as an exception. For a detailed discussion of the 
operation of the public and private realms in Australian hate speech legislation, see Anna 
Chapman, Kathleen Kelly "Australian Anti-Vilification Law: A discussion of the Public/Private 
Divide and the Work Relations Context" (2005) 27 Sydney LR 203. 
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original communicators of hate speech from liability if their conduct is 
performed for certain nominated purposes and in the specified manner. Even if 
conduct is objectively capable of inciting hatred, it does not contravene the civil 
provisions if it is engaged in reasonably and in good faith for the purposes of art, 
academia, religion, science, or any other purpose that is in the public interest.65 
Neither this public conduct exception nor the fair report exception applies 
to the criminal provisions of the New South Wales and Victorian legislation. 
While at first glance this approach appears anomalous, a closer consideration of 
the issue demonstrates that the requirement of intent to incite the requisite 
feelings and outcomes precludes the relevance of the exceptions. If an offender 
has the intention of inciting hatred towards, serious contempt for or severe 
ridicule of a group of people on the ground of one of the specified characteristics, 
then his or her conduct cannot be performed in good faith. Similarly, an intention 
to bring about the requisite feelings in others precludes the possibility that the 
published matter constitutes a fair report of the hate speech. It is appropriate, 
then, that the criminal provision does not include exceptions. 
The question of whether the fair report exception ought to be joined by its 
public conduct counterpart in the civil provision is more contentious. This 
section first examines the Victorian and New South Wales experience with 
regard to the public conduct exception in order to determine whether section 61 
of the HRA could benefit from its inclusion. Having determined that it could, the 
section then turns to the phrasing of the exception, discerning the lessons New 
Zealand can draw from the two Australian states' legislature and judiciary. 
A Should the Civil Provision be Amended to Include a Public Conduct 
Exception? 
In the New South Wales and Victorian cases examined, nearly all the 
defendants whose conduct was found to incite the requisite feelings of hostility 
65 See note 23. 
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attempted to rely on the public conduct exception.66 None, however, successfully 
made out the exception on the facts. 67 It could be argued, then, that New Zealand 
is unlikely to benefit from the amendment of section 61 of the HRA to include 
exceptions to liability. 
While the exception clause is yet to prove useful to New South Wales and 
Victorian defendants, however, the factual situations of several cases 
demonstrate that it has the potential to be so. In Western Aboriginal Legal 
Service v Jones, for instance, the defendant talk-back radio host's description of 
the notional Aboriginal person was held "to raise a significantly wider subject for 
public discussion - namely, the right of a landlord to discriminate against 
unsatisfactory tenants". 68 The conduct was thus held to be in the "public 
interest".69 The defendant only failed to fulfil the requirements of the exception 
because he did not prove that the conduct was carried out "reasonably and in 
good faith".70 
While this case was undoubtedly correctly decided, a similar situation in 
which the defendant did perform the conduct reasonably and in good faith is 
easily imagined. The fact that such a defendant is not protected from liability 
under New Zealand's law is a matter of concern. Section 61 of the HRA ought to 
be amended to include a public conduct exception for the original communicator 
66 It does not appear from the judgement that the defendant in Burns v Dye attempted to rely on 
the public conduct exception (Burns v Dye [2002] NSW ADT 32 <www.austlii.edu.au> (last 
accessed 29 August 2005)). 
67 In John Fairfax Publications Ltd v Kazak and Veloskey & Anor v Karagiannakis & Ors the 
New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel overturned the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal's findings that the defendants had breached the two Acts, 
partly on the basis of the lower Tribunal's application of the exception clauses. However, the 
Appeal Panel's decision in each case was based on the absence of a clear indication from the 
lower Tribunal that it had properly considered the relevant factual matters as required by law 
(John Fairfax Publications v Kazak [2002] NSWADTAP 35 para 26 <www.austlii .edu.au> (last 
accessed 29 August 2005), Veloskey & Anor v Karagiannakis & Ors [2002] NSW ADTAP 18 
faras 14-17 <www .austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005)). 
8 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor [2000] NSW ADT 102 para 147 
Silva J and N Rees <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
69 Similarly, in Kazak v John Fairfax Publications, the defendant's publication of an article that 
stated Palestinians to "remain vicious thugs who show no serious willingness to comply with 
agreements" was also held to be in the public interest, addressing the important public issue of 
the peace process in the Middle East (Kazak v John Fairfax Publications, above, paras 7, 86). 
70 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor, above, para 149. 
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of the hate speech so as to ensure that the right of freedom of expression is not 
too severely trampled by that of freedom from vilification.71 
B How Should the Public Conduct Exception be Phrased? 
Just as the New South Wales and Victorian experience demonstrates that 
the inclusion of the public conduct exceptions within the civil provision is of 
potential benefit, it also indicates that the phrasing and interpretation of the 
exceptions can require legislative and judicial decisions that are highly 
significant in terms of the operation of the provision as a whole. In particular, 
New South Wales and Victorian courts have addressed the issues of where the 
burden of proof should lie, how the nominated purposes should be interpreted, 
and what it means for conduct to be carried out "reasonably and in good faith". 
This section will examine each issue in turn. 
1 Where should the burden of proof lie? 
Both the New South Wales and the Victorian legislatures provide that the 
defendant has the onus of proving that the public conduct and fair report 
exceptions apply, with the RRTA stating that a person does not contravene the 
civil provisions "if the person establishes that" she engaged in the conduct in a 
manner consistent with one of the exceptions.72 As the New South Wales case of 
Western Aboriginal Service v Jones notes, this approach is contrary to that of the 
common law, where "it has long been accepted in cases involving allegations of 
unlawful discrimination that the complainant bears the burden of proof'.73 
71 The amendment of section 61 of the HRA would go some way to alleviating the concern of 
Grant Huscroft that it "cannot be justified as [a] reasonable limitation[n] on freedom of 
expression". See Grant Huscroft, Paul Rishworth Rights and freedoms: the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 202-209. 
72 RRTA sections 11, 12. Section 104 of the ADA provides: 
Where by any provision of this Act of the regulations conduct is excepted from conduct 
that is unlawful under this Act or the regulations of that is a contravention of this Act or 
the regulations, the onus of proving the exception in any proceedings before the Tribunal 
relating to a complaint lies on the respondent. 
13 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor, above, para 125. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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In light of the subjective nature of the exception, however, the New South 
Wales and Victorian legislatures' reversal of the burden of proof is appropriate. 
Rather than requiring complainants to bring evidence as to why the defendant's 
conduct was not performed with the requisite good faith, it is more appropriate to 
oblige defendants to demonstrate the applicability of the exceptions to them. The 
defendant is in a better position to give evidence of her - the defendant's - state 
of mind than is the plaintiff. If New Zealand is to modify the approach to the 
HRA to include the public conduct exceptions, the legislature ought to follow 
New South Wales and Victoria's lead to specify that the defendant has the onus 
of proving that the exception applies. 
2 For what purposes should the conduct be performed in order to come within 
the public conduct exception? 
In order for the conduct to come within the public conduct exception, 
both the ADA and the RRTA require that it is performed for certain nominated 
purposes. While the wording of the two Acts differs slightly, they both specify 
the purposes of academia, art, science, and any other purpose that is in the public 
interest. The RRTA also specifies religion as a nominated purpose, although the 
ADA's silence on the issue does not constitute a significant difference, as 
conduct performed for religious purposes will be caught by the public interest net. 
Some critics of the legislation fear that the specification of purposes for 
which public conduct can be excepted constitutes a form of elitism, creating "a 
special, privileged class that is exempt from the sanctions of the law".74 While 
such a bias would be concerning, a close reading of the Acts demonstrates the 
criticism is ill-founded. The specification of the nominated purposes does not 
confine the exception to discussion by artists, academics, scientists, or religious 
leaders. Rather, it is open to any defendant to prove that her conduct was carried 
out reasonably and in good faith for one of the nominated purposes. What is 
more, both the New South Wales and Victorian legislature indicate that the 
public interest net incorporates a broad range of conduct, with the ADA 
74 Hon CA Strong (13 June 2001) VicHansard 1424 Parliament of Victoria 
<htlp://tex.parliament. vic.gov.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
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specifying that it includes "discussion or debate about the expositions of any act 
or matter" .75 
Just as the nominated purposes are not only of benefit to an elite class of 
people, not all the conduct of that supposedly elite class is protected by the 
provisions. That is, the conduct of artists, academics, scientists and religious 
leaders is not automatically exempted from liability by virtue of their position. 
Rather, as the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal observes in Islamic 
Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, in order for conduct to fall 
within the nominated purposes it must genuinely be performed for those 
reasons. 76 As noted above, that case involved a Christian pastor's seminar 
teaching Christians how to "witness" to Muslims. While the defendant's conduct 
was held to come within the nominated purpose of "religion", the defendant's 
position as a pastor would not have shielded him from liability were he to have 
vilified Muslim people on the ground of their race. It was only because the 
pastor's statements were "made because of the religious beliefs and activities of 
Muslims who adhere to the religion of Islam" that they were held to have been 
performed for a religious purpose.77 
If New Zealand is to adopt the public conduct exceptions, the nominated 
purposes formula appears to constitute a useful approach. While the ADA and 
the RRTA specify a number of purposes for which conduct may be excepted, it 
seems that the over-riding connection between them is that they have the 
potential to operate for the betterment of society - in the "public interest". With 
this emphasis in mind, the limitation that the nominated purposes impose on the 
exception appears justified. In light of the fact that, in order for the exception to 
be relevant, the conduct must, by definition, be capable of causing harm, it is 
only appropriate for it to be exempted from liability if it has the potential to do 
good as well. The nominated purposes formula provides a sound example for 
75 ADA section 20C(2)(c). 
76 
/ slamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc ( Final) [2004] YCA T 2510 para 12 
Higgins J <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
77 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc, above para 13. While the 
defendant's comments were held to come within a nominated purpose, the exception was not 
made out as they were not held to be performed "reasonably and in good faith" . 
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New Zealand to follow if section 61 of the HRA is to be amended to include a 
public conduct exception. 
3 In what manner should the conduct be performed in order to come within the 
public conduct exception? 
In addition to the requirement that the conduct is performed for one of the 
nominated purposes, the public conduct exceptions of the ADA and the RRTA 
also require that the conduct is carried out "reasonably and in good faith" .78 Just 
as the nominated purposes operate to place a limit on the type of conduct that can 
be excepted from liability, the "reasonably and in good faith" requirement serves 
to limit the manner in which that conduct can be performed. While the factual 
evidence as to whether the conduct is performed reasonably and in good faith 
will often overlap, "reasonableness" and "good faith" are two separate concepts, 
and have been interpreted as such by the courts. This section will examine each 
requirement in tum. 
Turning first to the requirement of good faith, it is evident that, due to the 
plethora of contexts in which the concept appears, there is a wide range of 
interpretative approaches available for the courts to consider. The Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal draws upon the approach of the Federal Court of 
Australia's analysis in Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity 
Commission, in which it is argued that, in the context of racial vilification 
provisions, both subjective and objective good faith is required. 79 That 1s, m 
78 ADA section s20C(2)(c), RRTA section 11. 
19 Broplw v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004) FCAFC 16 para 102 
<www.austlii .edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). While Bropho v Human Rights & Equal 
Opportunity Commission concerns a complaint under the Racial Discrimination Act (Cth), which 
looks to the capacity of the conduct to offend and humiliate rather than to incite the requisite 
feelings of hostility, its approach is relevant in this case as the exception clauses are closely 
comparable. Section 18D of the Racial Discrimination Act (Cth) provides that: 
Section 18C does not render unlawful anything said or done reasonably and in good 
faith: 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held for 
any genuine academic, artistic or scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in 
the public interest; or 
(c) in making or publishing: 
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public interest; or 
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order to bring themselves within the exception, defendants must both honestly 
have performed the conduct in good faith and have satisfied certain (unspecified) 
objective standards of conscientiousness. While the Court is clearly concerned 
that the breadth of the nominated purposes for which conduct can be excepted 
tilts the balance of the legislation too heavily in favour of free speech, it is 
difficult to ascertain, without further indication from the Court, exactly what 
standard of conscientiousness is required. 
By contrast, the New South Wales jurisprudence only requires proof of 
subjective good faith. As the New South Wales Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal has held, good faith "appears to be a state of mind and the crucial factor 
in determining the presence of good faith would seem to be whether the 
commentator honestly believed in the truth of what is said". 80 In light of the fact 
that the objective criteria are incorporated by the reasonableness requirement, the 
interpretation of good faith as an entirely subjective state of mind seems 
appropriate. What is more, the focus of the New South Wales jurisprudence on 
subjective good faith does not mean that there is no room for objectivity in 
assessing whether the state of mind was present. In some cases, objective 
circumstances may make it difficult to believe a defendant's assertion of her 
subjective good faith. In Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, 
for instance, the circumstance of the ridiculing nature with which the pastor 
dismissed the Muslim faith could be seen to objectively undermine his claim that 
the seminar was delivered in good faith for the purpose of teaching Christians 
how to "witness" to Muslims. 81 
The New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence demonstrates that the 
public conduct exception ought to include a subjective state of mind element. If 
defendants do not honestly believe the truth of their inciting messages, then they 
ought not to be excepted from liability. In order to avoid the confusion of the 
Victorian jurisprudence, however, the phrase "good faith" should be replaced 
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if the comment is an 
expression of a genuine belief held by the person making the comment. 
80 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor [2000) NSW ADT 102 para 122 
Silva J and N Rees <www.austlii.edu.aU> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
8 1 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc ( Final) [2004) YCAT 2510 para 
383 <www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
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with the word "honestly", an unambiguously subjective state of mind. If New 
Zealand amends section 61 of the HRA to include a public conduct exception, it 
ought to require that the spoken or published matter is "honestly" communicated 
in the public interest. 
The New South Wales and Victorian experience demonstrates the test of 
whether the conduct is engaged in "reasonably" to be equally contentious. 
Contrasting the test of "reasonableness" with the common law defamation 
defence of "fair comment", the New South Wales Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal concludes that the hate speech legislation's exceptions require a more 
narrow interpretation than their common Jaw defamation counterpart: 82 
For a comment or statement to be "reasonable", as opposed to " fair", it must be 
one which the ordinary, reasonable person would consider to be reasonable in 
the circumstances of the case. In contrast ... a comment which is fair need not 
be reasonable . . . it may be exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, provided it is 
honestly held. It follows that a comment or statement which is exaggerated, 
obstinate or prejudiced is unlikely to be reasonable. 
While the Tribunal has attempted to ensure that the exception provision does not 
operate as a "shield for unrestrained abuse", 83 it can be seen to have gone too far. 
All conduct that is likely to incite its audience to the requisite feelings of 
hostility on the ground of race, religion or sexuality is almost guaranteed to be 
"exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced". The approach of the New South Wales 
jurisprudence, then, renders the exception provision all but redundant. 
It could be argued, of course, that an objective requirement within the 
public conduct exception is itself futile. If people honestly believe that their 
inciting conduct is reasonable, then legislating against this mistakenly held belief 
is unlikely to prevent any harm. Despite the harshness on defendants, however, 
an objective requirement is necessary in order to provide the subjects of hate 
speech with legal recourse in the face of conduct that incites feelings of hatred or 
contempt towards them. While the New South Wales approach intrudes too 
severely on freedom of expression, a wholly subjective public exception clause 
82 Western Aboriginal Legal Service Limited v Jones & anor, above, para 121. 
83 Mr Brack (Premier of Victoria) (17 May 2001) Vicl-lansard 1285. 
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would undermine hate speech legislation's role in upholding the right to freedom 
from vilification. 
The balance struck by the Victorian jurisprudence is more promising. 
Again following the Federal Court, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal ties the 
requirement of reasonableness to the nominated purposes for which conduct must 
be performed in order to come within the public conduct exception. An act is 
performed "reasonably", it is explained, if it bears a rational relationship to the 
protected activity and is proportionate to what is necessary to carry it out.84 In 
Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, the Tribunal held that the 
pastor's seminar was not proportionate to the religious purpose of instructing 
Christians how to "witness" to Muslims, as it presented an "excessive" and "one-
sided" view of Muslims' beliefs.85 Hence, the reasonableness requirement was 
not fulfilled. 
If faced with the reasonableness requirement of the two Australian 
jurisdictions' public conduct exceptions, New Zealand courts would be likely to 
take a similar approach to that of Victoria. Indeed, in interpreting the 
reasonableness requirement in section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, which provides 
that, in order to be consistent with the Act, any limit on a protected right must be 
"reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society", New 
Zealand courts have required a proportional and rational connection between the 
limit and its objective.86 Although probable that a public conduct exception to 
section 61 of the HRA would be interpreted in a similar way, however, this 
approach is by no means guaranteed. If, taking into account section 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act, the courts find that a more restrictive interpretation of the word 
"reasonably" is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society, then 
the Bill of Rights Act would not preclude this approach. 87 That is, if New 
Zealand courts found that it is demonstrably justified to require defendants to 
prove that their conduct was not exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, then this 
84 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries Inc ( Final), above, para 388, quoting 
Broplzo v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16 para 79 French J 
<www.austlii.edu.au> (last accessed 29 August 2005). 
85 Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch The Fire Ministries, above, para 389. 
86 Hopkinson v Police [2004) 3 NZLR 70 para 52 (HC) France J. 
87 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003) 138. 
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significant limitation on freedom of speech would be held to be consistent with 
the Bill of Rights. 
In order to avoid this potential volatility, the New Zealand legislature 
ought to specify that, in order to make out the public conduct exception, a 
defendant need only prove a relatively low standard of reasonableness. If section 
61 of the HRA is amended to include a public conduct exception along the lines 
of the New South Wales and Victorian legislation, the requirement that the 
conduct is performed "reasonably" should be replaced by the requirement that it 
is performed "not manifestly unreasonably". 
C Summary 
The New South Wales and Victorian experience demonstrates that the 
enactment of a public conduct exception is necessary in order to appropriately 
balance the rights and freedoms at stake. In order to limit the impact of the HRA 
on freedom of expression, then, New Zealand ought to seriously consider 
amending section 61 to include a public conduct exception to liability. Far from 
adopting the New South Wales or Victorian models in their exact form, however, 
the judicial experience of the two jurisdictions provides valuable lessons for the 
New Zealand legislature. While the nominated purposes formula of the ADA and 
RRTA provide a sound basis, the requirement that the conduct is performed 
"reasonably and in good faith" introduces a volatility to the provisions that 
would not be alleviated by New Zealand's Bill of Rights obligations. In order to 
avoid the confusion over subjectivity and objectivity, the ambiguous requirement 
of good faith should be replaced with the unambiguously subjective requirement 
that the conduct is performed "honestly". Further, the word "reasonably" should 
be replaced by the phrase "not manifestly unreasonably". In this way, while not 
acting as a shield for abuse, the public conduct exception ensures that free 
speech is not too severely limited. 
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VI DRAFT LEGISLATION 
The lessons that New Zealand can draw from the New South Wales and 
Victorian jurisprudence can be seen to culminate in the following tentative 
revision of section 61 of the HRA. Retaining the present content of the section in 
almost identical form, the draft legislation demonstrates that the simple addition 
of several clauses can more successfully balance the rights of freedom of 
expression and freedom from vilification.88 
Section 61. Racial disharmony-
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(a) To publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or 
television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(b) To use in any public place as defined in section 2(1) of the 
Summary Offences Act 1981, or within the hearing of persons in 
any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are 
invited to have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or 
insulting; or 
(c) To use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or 
insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have 
known that the words were reasonably likely to be published in a 
newspaper, magazine or periodical or broadcast by means of radio 
or television, -
being matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into 
contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New 
88 lf the legislature proposed to amend section 61 of the HRA in accordance with the draft 
legislation, the Bill would almost be guaranteed to survive a section 7 Bill of Rights Act vet. The 
draft legislation serves to soften the current provision 's impact on freedom of expression, a right 
protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights. 
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Zealand on the grounds of any of the characteristics listed in section 
21(1) of this Act. 89 
(2) In determining whether a person has contravened subsection (1), the 
person's intention in publishing, distributing or using the written matter 
or words is irrelevant. 
(3) Nothing in this section renders unlawful-
(a) The publication, distribution, or use of written matter or words, 
honestly and not manifestly unreasonably, for academic, artistic, 
religious or scientific purposes, or any other purpose that is of 
public concern; or 
(b) A fair report of the publication, distribution, or use of written 
matter or words referred to in subsection (1).90 
(4) In determining whether the requirements in subsection (3) are met, the 
burden of proof is on the defendant. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, -
"Newspaper" means a paper containing public news or observations on 
public news, or consisting wholly or mainly of advertisements, being a 
newspaper that is published periodically at intervals not exceeding 3 
months; 
89 Section 61 (I) of the draft legislation is identical to section 61 (1) of the HRA in its present form. 
As argued in Part III General Approach, however, the requirement that the communicated matter 
is "threatening, abusive or insulting" is possibly redundant, as if conduct is capable of inciting the 
requisite feelings of hostility in others it will almost definitely be threatening, abusive or insulting 
to its subject. If the "threatening, abusive or insulting" requirement is abandoned, an alternative 
section 61 (I) could take the following form: 
lt shall be unlawful for any person to publish, distribute, broadcast or use in any public 
place matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group 
of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the grounds of any of the 
characteristics listed in section 21(1) of this Act. 
90 Section 61 (3)(b) of the draft legislation is not intended to alter the meaning of section 61 (2) of 
the HRA (its corresponding provision). The wordiness of the present section 61 (2), however, is 
not felt to impart any meaning that the slimmer suggested alternative does not. 
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I 
"Publishes" or "distributes" means publishes or distributes to the public 
at large or to any member or members of the public; 
"Written matter" includes any writing, sign, visible representation, or 
sound recording. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The present select committee inquiry into hate speech indicates that there 
is a possibility that New Zealand's hate speech provisions will soon be reformed. 
In comparison to the approach of many other Commonwealth jurisdictions, New 
Zealand's hate speech legislation is somewhat limited in scope, applying only to 
vilification on the ground of race. Any reform of the provisions is likely to 
extend their applicability to a greater number of grounds. 
In contemplating the manner in which this expansion should best be 
effected, full consideration ought to be given to the different approaches that can 
be taken to legislate against hate speech. If the current HRA formula is retained, 
however, the New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence demonstrates that it 
can be modified to more successfully balance the rights and freedoms at stake. In 
particular, section 61, in its current form, may have the potential to impinge too 
severely on the right of freedom of expression. By amending the civil provision 
to include a public conduct exception, this danger can be guarded against. While 
the New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence indicates that the addition of 
exceptions can bring a degree of volatility to the provisions, careful legislative 
drafting can ensure that an appropriate balance is achieved. 
The New South Wales and Victorian jurisprudence demonstrates that 
New Zealand need not be afraid of creating a more prominent role for hate 
speech law within our legislative framework. By imposing only a minimal limit 
on freedom of speech, hate speech legislation has the potential to constitute a 
valuable tool in the construction of a more tolerant society. 
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